Various questions can be examined when discussing safety in general. Among these, some key issues are the attitude toward risk and its acceptance, the ways of identifying, analyzing, and quantifying risks, and societal factors and public opinion toward risks. The identification and quantification of risks are central in the regulatory framework and decision making and will be the focus of this article. Various approaches have been used for safety analysis over the years. This paper will survey some of the central attitudes in the nuclear reactor regulation philosophy and discuss the historical background surrounding them. Among these, we mention the “defense-in-depth” approach, the design basis accident (DBA), and beyond design basis accident (BDBA) analyses and discuss the rather subjective nature of their associated decision making. We maintain that it has long been recognized that the natural approach that comes out of the scientific method of inquiry is the probabilistic one, which in today's tools is conducted through the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) method. This approach unlike the deterministic one, which produced concepts like DBA and defense-in-depth, enables us to put risks into context and to compare different risks such as those posed by different activities in particular or by other industries in general. It has consequently been gaining wide acceptance in regulatory bodies around the world as an effective tool in the inspection and regulation of nuclear reactors. Yet, it is also recognized that despite significant development over the past few decades, PSA still suffers from some well-known deficiencies. Its main benefit at this point is its contribution to identification and prioritization of design features, maintenance, management, and quality assurance (QA) important to safety. PSA has mostly been used in the nuclear power industry, but in recent years it has also started to be incorporated in research reactor (RR) safety analysis, and we therefore cover the subject of PSA usage for this purpose as well.
Skip Nav Destination
Article navigation
July 2017
Technical Briefs
A Review of Safety Analysis Philosophies for Nuclear Reactors
N. Yair
N. Yair
Search for other works by this author on:
A. S. Schneider
N. Yair
Manuscript received July 18, 2016; final manuscript received December 17, 2016; published online May 25, 2017. Assoc. Editor: Michio Murase.
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci. Jul 2017, 3(3): 034501 (3 pages)
Published Online: May 25, 2017
Article history
Received:
July 18, 2016
Revised:
December 17, 2016
Citation
Schneider, A. S., and Yair, N. (May 25, 2017). "A Review of Safety Analysis Philosophies for Nuclear Reactors." ASME. ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci. July 2017; 3(3): 034501. https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4035565
Download citation file:
117
Views
Get Email Alerts
Cited By
Investigating the Suitability of Cu2ZnSnS4 Thin Films for Gamma Radiation Dosimetry Applications in Nonmedical Environments
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (April 2025)
Introduction to Nuclear Forensics Analysis Techniques
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (January 2025)
Related Articles
Analyses of Feedwater Trip With SBO Sequence of VVER1000 Reactor
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (October,2016)
Enhancing the Plant's Capability for Design Basis and Design Extension Conditions Based on Time-Dependent Context Evaluation of Human Performance in ATWS Events
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (April,2018)
Safety Improvement to Israel Research Reactor 2 by Increasing the Robustness of Equipment to Ground Acceleration
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (July,2017)
Causes and Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl and Fukushima Nuclear Accidents
ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci (April,2018)
Related Chapters
Introduction
Fundamentals of Nuclear Fuel
Design of Defense-in-Depth Architecture of Web System Security Based on Seam
International Conference on Computer Technology and Development, 3rd (ICCTD 2011)
Research of the P2P Worm Defense Mechanism Based on Trust Mechanism
International Conference on Information Technology and Computer Science, 3rd (ITCS 2011)