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ASME Press Select Proceedings

International Conference on Advanced Computer Theory and Engineering, 4th (ICACTE 2011)

By
Yi Xie
Yi Xie
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ISBN:
9780791859933
No. of Pages:
840
Publisher:
ASME Press
Publication date:
2011

Position auction is an effective mechanism for search engines to determine the position of advertisement. The search engines let the advertiser specify a single amount as their bid in the auction. This amount is interpreted as the optimal tender price the advertiser is willing to pay per click on its ad. The optimal tender price allows the advertiser obtain maximum expected return in the generalized first price position auction. In this paper, the assume conditions are noted in the position auction base on the Friedman's model and the probability of winning bid model of the position auction is formulated. By...

Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. The Winning Bidding Probability Model
3. Optimal Tender Price Selected Model in the Generalized First Price Position Auction
4. Numerical Example Generate the Data Randomly
5. Summaries
6. References
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